Ukraine Invasion What Russians Really Think About The War

Moving to less enthusiastic supporters of the conflict, there are several shifts in attitude.

Unlike the first group, these more ambivalent supporters make no references to “fascists” and “Nazis” in Ukraine. Second, the emotions they express over the invasion in interviews are darker. Third, their understanding of the reasons behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is hazier.

In general, while supporters try to deny Russia’s responsibility for the war and its disastrous consequences, doubters – deliberately or not – try to avoid having an opinion. They distance themselves from the war, citing their inability to figure out what is going on, or to influence it.

Some doubters are closer to the supporters’ side; some are closer to the opponents. Either way, they say they don’t really understand the reasons for the war.

During interviews, they list possible causes. They may echo some of the supporters’ main arguments – for example, about the threat posed by NATO or the need to resolve the Donbas conflict. But they aren’t sure whether these arguments make sense. They use doubt to distance themselves from any narrative that explains the war.

They acknowledge the violent character of the conflict, and the death and destruction it brings to Ukraine. But instead of justifying the war and denying its horrible consequences as supporters do, or rejecting and condemning it like opponents, doubters accept it as a matter of fact.

For them, Putin started the war for unknown reasons, and they delegate the right to decide the future of Russia’s involvement to others. “I believe we know only 5% of what is happening,” said a young entrepreneur from Moscow, explaining why she does not follow news about the war.

“If I have an opportunity to influence the situation, if something depends on me – sure, I will do everything to stop the war.”

On the whole, the doubters’ feelings of disempowerment result in a sort of sad pragmatism. They try to focus on their private lives, the one area they believe they can control – their work, relationships and mental health.

Finally, those who oppose the war experience the strongest negative emotions: about the war itself, the destruction and death; about the indifference they often see around them in Russian society; about their inability to change anything; about their futures and the future of the country.

Just like the doubters, they sometimes do not understand the reasons for the war, but they do not use this to avoid having an opinion about it. For them, Russia’s war on Ukraine has no justification.

By looking at all three groups together, we can see how the same arguments can play very different roles in different people’s narratives.

Doubters refer to the “information war” and list the different possible causes of war to justify their lack of an opinion. Supporters and opponents use the same references, but in order to make a judgement rather than avoid it.

Where next?
Another way to characterise the three groups is that there are those who deny the war, those who avoid it, and those who experience constant guilt about it.

“War is bad, but is it a [real] war?”, the supporters ask, adding that the invasion of Ukraine was necessary and unavoidable. “War is bad, but we don’t know who to blame,” say the doubters, suggesting it’s impossible to change anything in any case. “War is bad, it’s Russia’s fault – our fault – and we are all damned,” say the opponents.

Can people change their opinions? Supporters are not ready to give up on the idea that the war was necessary. But their support can scale down if they see that Russia is paying too high a price. The recent Ukrainian counter-attack in the Kharkiv region demonstrates that shift: while some warmongers still try to insist on the necessity of the war, others are starting to question its possible consequences and even the qualifications of decision-makers.

The paradox is that doubters, while being the most detached from the war, are the most sensitive to its consequences for their private lives. They might consolidate around Putin if they believe they have no choice: the war has already happened and the whole world is against them now. Or they could become more dissatisfied, because they tend to delegate responsibility for the current situation to those in power – especially if they begin to experience a dramatic shift in their personal well-being.

Opponents might not support the war, but even their views can change, especially in a situation where Western states become increasingly hostile to Russian citizens.

This range of emotions signals that Russian society is in turmoil over the country’s invasion of Ukraine. However this war ends, these emotions will find their way into the public sphere – but nobody yet knows in what form.